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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-1254 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL DELBRIDGE,  
                                                      Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-05-cr-00135-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2012 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 15, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Delbridge was sentenced to a term of 188 months’ incarceration and five 
years of supervised release after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute 5 
grams or more of cocaine base.  At issue in this appeal is the District Court’s order 
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denying Delbridge’s motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We will affirm. 
I 
 A grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania charged Delbridge with two 
counts of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base (Count I 
and Count III) and one count of possession with intent to distribute less than 5 grams of 
cocaine base (Count II).  Following the indictment, Delbridge entered into a written plea 
agreement with the Government.  He pleaded guilty to Count III and waived his rights to 
take a direct appeal, except in a few limited circumstances, or file a collateral proceeding 
attacking his sentence.  In return, the Government moved to dismiss Counts I and II. 
 The District Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy, during which it explained 
the maximum sentence that Delbridge could receive under the applicable statute and the 
Guidelines range that likely applied based on a preliminary presentence report.1
 The District Court then reviewed the terms of the plea agreement with Delbridge 
  The 
District Court also explained that it was not bound by the advisory Guidelines range in 
determining Delbridge’s sentence.  Delbridge affirmed that he understood, and confirmed 
under oath that no one had promised him a specific sentence, nor had anyone predicted 
what his actual sentence would be. 
                                                 
 1 At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor and Delbridge’s counsel agreed that 
the applicable advisory Guidelines range was 188–235 months, based on Delbridge’s 
offense level of 31 and criminal history category of VI.  Delbridge’s offense level was 
based, in part, on the determination that he was a career offender.  
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and addressed the fact that Delbridge was giving up his right to collaterally attack the 
judgment of sentence: 
[Q:] You are also giving up your right, any right you may have to file a 
motion to vacate sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, 
for habeas corpus release [sic], and you’re also giving up other valuable 
rights to obtain collateral review of your sentence.  Do you understand, sir? 
 
[A:] Yes, sir.  
 
 The District Court sentenced Delbridge as a career offender under United States 
Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 4B1.1.  The PSR showed that Delbridge had twice been 
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance, once in 1992 and once in 1994, and 
Delbridge had stipulated to being a career offender in his plea agreement.  The District 
Court sentenced Delbridge to a term of 188 months’ incarceration and five years of 
supervised release, a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. 
 Despite having waived his right to appellate review, Delbridge filed a direct appeal 
on February 26, 2008.  The Government filed a motion to enforce the appellate waiver, 
and we granted that motion.  Undeterred by either our decision dismissing his appeal or 
by his express waiver of his right to collaterally attack the sentence, Delbridge filed a 
motion to vacate his judgment of sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on November 29, 
2010.  Delbridge raised four claims in his motion: 
(1) He was denied effective assistance of counsel because of his counsel’s 
erroneous advice concerning his offense level and his counsel’s failure 
to investigate;  
 
(2) He was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney 
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failed to consult with him concerning a suppression hearing, and failed 
to follow through with that hearing; 
 
(3) He was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney 
failed to investigate whether his prior convictions actually qualified him 
for sentencing as a career offender; and 
 
(4) He was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because his 
attorney did not litigate his career offender status. 
 
 The District Court summarily denied the motion, explaining that Delbridge 
“knowingly, voluntarily, and with full understanding of the consequences waived his right 
to file any collateral challenge to his conviction or judgment of sentence, and he fails to 
even allege, [much] less point to facts or circumstances in support, that enforcement of 
the waiver in his case would work a miscarriage of justice.” 
 On July 19, 2011, we granted a certificate of appealability on three issues: (1) 
whether the District Court erred in enforcing the waiver provision sua sponte; (2) whether 
the District Court erred in enforcing the waiver provision without providing Delbridge 
with notice and opportunity to respond; and (3) whether the District Court erred in 
concluding that the waiver provision barred all of Delbridge’s claims. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Delbridge’s claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  We have jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253.  Because the District Court decided Delbridge’s motion as a matter of law and 
without a hearing, we review its decision de novo.  See United States v. Eakman, 378 
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F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III 
 The District Court dismissed Delbridge’s motion to vacate sua sponte, finding that 
he had waived his right to collaterally attack the judgment of sentence.  A district court 
has the authority to dismiss a motion to vacate without ordering a response from the 
Government or holding an evidentiary hearing when it is clear from both the motion and 
the record that the movant is not entitled to relief.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Rule 4(b) of 
the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings.  Courts may raise and consider at least some 
affirmative defenses to the prisoner’s claims without waiting for the Government to raise 
those defenses itself.  See, e.g., United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 165 & n.15 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (statute of limitations).  Here, both Delbridge and the Government assume that 
the District Court had the power to raise the issue of Delbridge’s collateral proceedings 
waiver without the Government first having asserted the waiver as an affirmative defense.  
 As a matter of prudence, the District Court might have requested briefing from 
Delbridge on the waiver issue.  Because Delbridge’s waiver of his right to collateral 
proceedings is an affirmative defense that can be raised—or waived—by the Government, 
Delbridge was not required to include arguments in his motion to vacate regarding the 
applicability of the waiver.2
                                                 
 2 In United States v. Goodson, we explained that “a defendant is not obliged in his 
opening brief to acknowledge the existence of an appellate waiver and/or to explain why 
the waiver does not preclude appellate review of the substantive issue raised.  Rather, it is 
  Based on only the record and the motion to vacate, it was 
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theoretically possible that Delbridge had valid arguments regarding the waiver that could 
not be discerned from the record.  See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 238 & n.7 
(3d Cir. 2008) (suggesting that a defendant’s claim that he was actually misled may 
sometimes involve facts outside the record and require an evidentiary hearing); Bendolph, 
409 F.3d at 165 n.15 (explaining that movants should be given an opportunity to respond 
when the court raises a statute of limitations defense because some relevant facts might 
not be apparent from the record and the petition alone). 
 We need not dwell on this procedural issue, however, as we have determined—
based both on a review of the record in the District Court and on the arguments that 
Delbridge now asserts in his appellate briefing—that the waiver does bar Delbridge’s 
claims in this case.  In assessing the validity of a waiver, courts must consider whether the 
waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and whether its enforcement would 
work a miscarriage of justice.  Mabry, 536 F.3d at 237.  Although Delbridge argues in his 
appellate briefing that he did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, 
and that enforcement would work a miscarriage of justice, none of his specific claims 
require additional factfinding, and the record demonstrates that his claims lack merit. 
                                                                                                                                                             
only after the government has invoked an appellate waiver as a bar to our review that a 
defendant must raise a challenge to the waiver’s enforceability.”  544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Although Goodson involved a direct appeal, not a § 2255 motion, the same 
reasoning applies here.  Prisoners are not required to respond to all potential affirmative 
defenses that the Government may raise in its responsive briefing.  See Bendolph, 409 
F.3d at 165 n.15 (3d Cir. 2005); Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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A 
 Delbridge contends that his plea colloquy was facially insufficient because the 
District Court’s description of the waiver was not sufficiently detailed.  He compares the 
explanation of his waiver with the explanation provided in the plea colloquy in United 
States v. Mabry.  There, the prosecutor and the defense attorney described to Mabry, on 
the record, the nature of a collateral proceeding.  536 F.3d at 234.  Mabry was told by his 
attorney that the right to collaterally attack a sentence is “a right after direct appeal for 
you, for instance, to raise issues that may have to do with my ineffectiveness or other 
collateral issues that could not have been raised on appeal.”  Id.  Delbridge argues that the 
District Court should have defined “collateral proceedings” and explained specifically 
that Delbridge would be waiving his right to challenge the effectiveness of his counsel. 
 The transcript of the plea colloquy shows that Delbridge waived his right to 
collaterally attack his sentence knowingly and voluntarily.  Although the District Court 
may not have described “collateral review” in the same depth as the defense counsel in 
Mabry, it was not required to do so.  Delbridge’s plea colloquy was conducted in 
accordance with Rule 11(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  He was 
advised of the rights that he was waiving; the District Court stated that he was waiving 
his right to file a motion to vacate his sentence “and other valuable rights to obtain 
collateral review of your sentence,” and Delbridge confirmed under oath that he 
understood what the Court was telling him.  The District Court was not required to define 
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further or characterize “collateral proceedings,” nor was it required to list the types of 
claims that Delbridge would no longer be permitted to bring as a result of that waiver.  
See, e.g., Mabry, 536 F.3d at 239 (holding that the sentencing court was not required to 
specifically define “miscarriage of justice” or “advise a defendant of its practical 
applications”). 
B 
 Delbridge also argues that he was actually misled about the consequences of his 
waiver, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish that claim.  Delbridge 
contends that “he was told by pre-plea counsel that he would be sentenced at an offense 
level 26 if he pled guilty,” a claim that “goes to what Delbridge actually understood, 
based on what he purports his pre-plea counsel told him during their private, attorney-
client communications, communications not a part of the record before the District 
Court.” 
 The plea colloquy transcript also belies this argument.  Even if statements made by 
Delbridge’s counsel led Delbridge to believe, at some point, that he was going to be 
sentenced at an offense level of 26, multiple statements made to him during the plea 
colloquy should have dispelled such a belief.  At the plea colloquy, Delbridge was 
advised of the maximum sentence that he could receive, he was informed of the 
Guidelines range applicable to his case, and he was cautioned that the District Court was 
not bound by the Guidelines in determining his sentence.  Delbridge acknowledged that 
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he understood, and confirmed that no promises had been made to him about his actual 
sentence.  These explanations render any allegedly inaccurate comment made by 
Delbridge’s counsel irrelevant.  See United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“[D]efense counsel’s conjectures to his client about sentencing are irrelevant 
where the written plea agreement and in-court guilty plea colloquy clearly establish the 
defendant’s maximum potential exposure and the sentencing court’s discretion.”); United 
States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]ny alleged misrepresentations 
that Mustafa’s former counsel may have made regarding sentencing calculations were 
dispelled when Mustafa was informed in open court that there were no guarantees as to 
sentence, and that the court could sentence him to the maximum.”). 
C 
 Finally, Delbridge argues that we should decline to enforce his collateral 
proceedings waiver because barring his claims would work a miscarriage of justice.  In 
considering whether enforcing a waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice, we take 
into account “the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a 
fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the 
defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which 
the defendant acquiesced in the result.”  Mabry, 536 F.3d at 242–43 (quoting United 
States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2001)).  We apply the miscarriage of justice 
exception “sparingly and without undue generosity.”  United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 
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455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26).  The miscarriage of justice 
exception does not apply here because the record establishes that none of Delbridge’s 
substantive claims have merit. 
1 
 Delbridge asserts two claims related to his status as a career offender: (1) counsel 
should have investigated whether his prior convictions actually qualified him for 
sentencing as a career offender; and (2) counsel should have challenged this status at his 
sentencing hearing.  Delbridge argues that he did not have counsel when he was 
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance in 1993, and so that conviction should 
not have been used in sentencing him as a career offender.  He argues that if his counsel 
had adequately investigated his criminal history, he would have discovered that his 1993 
conviction was invalid, and he could have objected to its inclusion in the PSR. 
 To establish that he was denied ineffective assistance, Delbridge must show that 
his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688, 694 (1984).  Although a conviction obtained in violation of the right to appointed 
counsel should not count as a predicate conviction,3
                                                 
 3 See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (“To permit a conviction obtained 
in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or 
enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of that case.”  (citation 
 Delbridge cannot establish that his 
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attorney’s failure to investigate or litigate that issue prejudiced him in any way because he 
cannot show that he was denied representation in either of his prior distribution 
convictions.  Both of the sentencing orders from Delbridge’s Alabama convictions for 
unlawful distribution note that Delbridge appeared “with his attorney.”  Although it is 
unclear which of these convictions Delbridge contests—since neither of the orders is 
from 1993—it is sufficiently clear that he had counsel in both of the cases that were noted 
in the PSR.4
2 
  Thus, enforcing Delbridge’s waiver with respect to these claims does not 
result in a miscarriage of justice. 
 Delbridge also claims that he was denied effective assistance because his pre-plea 
counsel told him that he would be sentenced at an offense level of 26 if he pleaded guilty. 
 However, “we have long held that an erroneous sentencing prediction by counsel is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
omitted)); see also Curtis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994) (noting the holding 
in Burgett but declining to extend it to, inter alia, denial of effective assistance of 
counsel, explaining that “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant [is] a unique 
constitutional defect”). 
 4 Delbridge does not challenge the accuracy of any of the Alabama sentencing 
orders provided in the Government’s appendix.  He argues instead: “This Court directed 
the parties to address Delbridge’s 1993 conviction.  From the government’s Supplemental 
Appendix, it would appear that Delbridge had an attorney for all three of his Alabama 
convictions.  Of those three convictions, none actually occurred in 1993.”  Since the only 
mention of a 1993 conviction was in Delbridge’s motion to vacate—not in the PSR that 
the District Court relied on—it is the 1992 and 1994 distribution convictions that are 
relevant here.  (The third conviction referenced by Delbridge, from 1996, was a 
conviction for possession, not distribution, and so was not a part of the Court’s career 
offender determination.) 
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ineffective assistance of counsel where, as here, an adequate plea hearing was 
conducted.”  See Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299; United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  Because the District Court explained at the plea colloquy both Delbridge’s 
maximum potential sentence and the Court’s discretion in sentencing, and Delbridge 
confirmed under oath that there were no other agreements or promises regarding his 
potential sentence, enforcing Delbridge’s plea waiver with respect to this claim could not 
result in a miscarriage of justice.  See Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299. 
3 
 Delbridge asserted in his motion to vacate that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel because his pre-trial counsel failed to consult with him on a suppression 
hearing.  As the Government points out, however, Delbridge does not even attempt to 
explain in his appellate briefing why barring this claim would result in a miscarriage of 
justice.  Because Delbridge entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, 
and because he has not suggested that enforcing this claim would result in a miscarriage 
of justice, this claim is also barred. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Delbridge’s § 2255 motion to vacate. 
